In addition to robustness and fragility, security is a quite important issue in media authentication systems. This paper first examines the insecurity of several block-based authentication methods under counterfeit attacks. Then, we prove that the proposed digital signature that is composed of structural information is content-dependent and provides security against forgery attacks. Experimental results demonstrate the benefits of exploiting structural information in a media authentication system.
INTRODUCTION

Image Authentication
Methods of multimedia content authentication can be categorized into either digital signature-based or watermarkingbased. Digital signature (or robust hash) is basically a condensed representation or perceptual digest, which captures the essence of a media content. It is stored as an extra file and later used for authentication. Watermarking, on the other hand, is an invasive method that really embeds a message into a media data and the hidden message is later extracted to verify the authenticity of a media content.
In [11] , Wong proposed a block-wise fragile image watermarking method to detect tampered areas. At the watermark embedding stage, an image is first divided into nonoverlapping blocks and each block is watermarked individually. In [5] , Lin and Chang proposed a block DCT-based robust digital signature method for image authentication. Digital signature bits are quantized results, which are generated from comparing selected pairs of DCT coefficients in disjoint block pairs determined by a secret key.
Security vs. Counterfeit Attacks
Counterfeit attacks [2, 4] were addressed to raise the insecurity of [5, 11] . Security means the ability of deterring attackers from being able to forge an arbitrary image that can be authentic. Traditional block-based methods [5, 11] are common in that they considered disjoint blocks where no contextual information exists between them. With this prior knowledge, Holliman and Memon [4] proposed a counterfeit attack such that a forged image can still be authentic. Assume that attackers know the dimensions of a block unit and the binary logo but don't know the secret key used for hashing. The goal is to forge an arbitrary image Y from a set (A) of available authentic images such that it is perceptually similar to Y ( = 2 A ) and Y can be detected to contain watermarks that were previously inserted in the each element of A. At first, the image Y is divided into blocks from which block search is stirred in A. Only the best block match (in terms of minimum mean square error) is used to constitute the block unit of Y . The above process is repeatedly performed. In addition, Fridrich et al. [2] proposed a so-called "collage attack" to further improve the perceptual quality of a forged image generated from [4] by error diffusion.
As for [5] , Radhakrisnan and Memon [10] proposed a counterfeit attack to address an insecurity issue. Based on the assumption that a set of authentic images is available and the same key is used to generate mapping of block pairs, their attack is to deduce one block pair at each time according to an incoming signature bit. By repeatedly executing the above process, the mapping function of block pairs can be deduced. Thus, the corresponding pairs of DCT coefficients could be modified such that the desired magnitude relationship could be purposely created.
To maintain the security of watermarking-based authentication systems while not sacrificing the localization accuracy and increasing the complexity, content-dependent key [3] was addressed. The major characteristic is that the content-dependent key has to be extracted from a media content itself at the watermark generation and verification stages, respectively. However, it is not guaranteed to always produce the same key when media content has been distorted (This corresponds to a robustness issue.).
The underlying philosophy of [5, 11] is their independent block-based characteristic. The absence of employing structural information leads to the risk of counterfeit attacks. In this paper, we shall describe how a piece of structural information could be used to overcome the aforementioned counterfeit attacks. In addition, our content-dependent digital signature contains a kind of structural information that can be publicly known. Several results are provided to demonstrate the security of structural digital signature.
EXTRACTION OF STRUCTURAL INFORMATION AS DIGITAL SIGNATURE OR WATERMARK
We explore the security issue of the structural digital signature (SDS) scheme [7] . The SDS is constructed in the wavelet transform, which offers multiscale space-frequency localization and allows to design a digital signature with structural but secure information. In the wavelet domain of an image, the so-called joint (interscale) parent-child pairs exist. Parent-child pairs have been confirmed to be uncorrelated but statistically dependent [1] . This dependency mainly arises from the perceptually important semantic features, e.g., edges and textures. Based on these semantic features, the so-called structural digital signature is constructed to simultaneously resist against incidental manipulations (e.g., JPEG/JPEG2000 compression) and reflect malicious distortions. The construction of an SDS is summarized in Table 1 . Fig. 1 illustrates some selected parentchild pairs in the wavelet domain and the result mapping back into the spatial domain. Each parent-child pair represents a magnitude relationship involving different resolutions (frequencies). We will describe in the next section that this relationship is extremely difficult to forge. The extracted SDS has been stored for image authentication [7] or embedded for error concealment [6] and anti-disclosure of watermarks [8] . The main theme of this paper will be investigating the security of SDS.
CONTENT-DEPENDENT SECURITY
Despite several security aspects of SDS were analyzed in [7] , we will focus on the resistance of an SDS to forgery attack in this section.
Resistance to Disjoint-Block Counterfeit Attacks
The counterfeit attacks [2, 4] are based on block search and match. However, when the same operation is conducted to defeat the wavelet-based authentication scheme [7] , it is quite infeasible to expect the desired performance because the multiscale structure of wavelets contradicts the assumptions of [2, 4] . In the wavelet domain, each parent-child pair maps to a set of spatial pixels, which is of non-fixed size and possesses certain contextual dependencies. Under these circumstances, there is no clue (how to determine the size of (a) (b) Fig. 1 . Illustration of some parent-child pairs of an SDS in the wavelet domain. Two-level wavelet decomposition is performed. (a) Any two nodes connected by a line is a pair with their magnitude difference larger than a threshold (Table 1 ). (b) Significant parent-child pairs are mapped back into the pixel domain as isolated regions (illustrated in normal gray-scale). Apparently, the structural contents (e.g., textures and edges) are preserved. a block?) that can be utilized to make the collage attack success. This explains the advantage of adopting the multiscale structure of wavelets in designing an image's signature.
Some results are shown in Fig. 2 and Table 2 to demonstrate the unique anti-forgery of structural information. Figs. 2(a) and (b), respectively, show the counterfeit Lenna images generated from a database based on 32 32 and 8 8 block search and match. Our database is composed of 1000 images, excluding the Lenna. By inspecting Fig. 2(b) and original Lenna, they look perceptually similar but blocky effects remain. By comparing the structural digital signatures extracted from counterfeit images with that extracted from the original Lenna, the bit error rates (BERs) are listed in Table 2 . If the counterfeit image is created in an 8 8 basis and its SDS is extracted based on = 2 5 6 , the BER (as high as 0:276) is the smallest in Table 2 . This is because only a few lower frequency features, which is effective in hiding differences, are captured. However, the resultant BER is still sufficient to reveal that most regions have been malicious tampered with. In sum, these results verify that an SDS indeed resists against block-based counterfeit attacks. Table 1 . Construction of Structural Digital Signature (SDS) 1. Compute the DWT of an image. In our implementation, the size of the lowest frequency band is fixed to be 16 16. 2. Select those parent-child pairs with their magnitude difference larger than a pre-determined threshold . We consider this kind of pairs significant. In fact, is determined from the desired false positive and false negative probabilities.
3. For each selected pair, < p c > , it is classified as one of four types defined as follows. Type I: p > 0 and jpj > jcj; Type II: p < 0 and jpj > jcj; Type III: c > 0 and jpj < jcj; Type IV: c < 0 and jpj < jcj. 
Resistance to Forgery under Structural Information Leak
As we have described in Table 1 , an SDS is constructed from the magnitude relationships of significant parent-child pairs in the wavelet domain. In other words, an SDS has been created by taking larger wavelet coefficients into consideration. As described in [9] , larger wavelet coefficients can be efficiently used to approximately reconstruct an original signal. Now, we will prove that the proposed SDS can tolerate the Radhakrisnan and Memon's attack [10] .
Owing to an SDS is constructed from the parent-child pairs with significant magnitude differences, locations of these significant pairs in an image are not a secret at all so that attackers can know this prior knowledge. Let Y be a target image from which attackers try to create an SDS similar to that of an original image X by using this publicly known prior knowledge. The only way that attackers can do is to modify the magnitude relationships of parent-child pairs (which are significant in X) to be significant. In addition, the modified pairs still have to be selected in the verification stage without affecting the authentication capability. If the pair-wise wavelet coefficients in Y have been modified but cannot be selected later for verification, then this kind of modifications is regarded as useless. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to enforce an undesired pairwise relationship while maintaining transparency. If an image to be authenticated is of poor quality, then it can be directly rejected before it is fed into an authentication system. Let Y be modified as Y . There may exist some ways for attackers to preserve the same SDS between X and Y . A simple way is to first sort the wavelet coefficients of images X and Y , respectively. Then, the sorted result of Y is re-ordered according to the sorted result of X and is reconstructed by inverse wavelet transform as Y . It is said that this attack is successful if Y is sill perceptually similar to Y . With this attack, we have the following corollary. Proof: An image Y is modified as Y such that both X and Y have the same parent-child relationships among the selected significant pairs. In addition, based on the principle of [7] the selected parent-child pairs are more significant than those that are not selected. As a result, an image X can be specified as a significant term S(X) and a residual term R(X), i.e., X = S(X) + R(X). When a forgery attack (see the description given above) is applied on Y to obtain Y , we have Y = S(X ) + R(Y ), where S(X ) and S(X) denote the signals reconstructed from the same significant parent-child pairs (they may have slight difference in magnitudes). Furthermore, according to the signal reconstruction mechanism [9] , the reconstructed signal Y is perceptually similar to X because both of them have similar semantic features, i.e., S(X ) S(X). In practice, attackers may wish to discard all un-selected pairs or make them small such that the magnitude difference of a selected "significant" pair could be not large. Under this circumstance, the reconstructed signal, S(X ), will still be a smooth version of its original one, X. Besides, the high-frequency components can also be retained for image reconstruction. This will act like noise addition and will not affect the perceptual similarity between X and Y . On the other hand, the perceptual similarity between Y and Y will be low because their significant part, S(Y ) and S(X ), are greatly different [9] . Based on the above deductions, we have verified the result: P S N R (Y Y ) << P SN R(X Y ).
